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| Author: | Rubio, S.J. Ulph, A. |
| Title: | Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited |
| Journal: | Oxford Economic Papers
2006 : APR, VOL. 58:2, p. 233-263 |
| Index terms: | contracts environmental protection international co-operation |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations in a pollution abatement model where he is not constraining emissions to be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. It is argued that more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emission game. When this is done, it is shown analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper are maintained. |
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