search query: @indexterm Public services / total: 243
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| Author: | Jehiel, P. |
| Title: | Bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1997 : JUL, VOL. 65:1, p. 61-74 |
| Index terms: | PUBLIC SERVICES LOCAL PLANNING DELEGATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study shows in the case of quasi-linear preferences that delegation to benevolent jurisdictions induces distortions away from efficiency because of the divergence between social and jurisdictional objectives, and the impossibility for jurisdictions to realise side payments without modifying either the provision of local public goods or the distribution of consumers. The main result extends to the case of heterogeneous populations. A difference when individuals have heterogeneous location tastes is that the absence of spill-over does not necessarily lead any longer to a threat point that is bargaining-efficient. |
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