search query: @indexterm FAMILY FIRMS / total: 243
reference: 56 / 243
| Author: | Villalonga, B. Amit, R. |
| Title: | How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2006 : MAY, VOL. 80:2, p. 385-417 |
| Index terms: | management control company value family firms |
| Freeterms: | ownership |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Using data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, it is found that family (hereafter as: f.) ownership creates value only when the founder (here as: fndr.) serves as CEO of the f. firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. The findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict (as: o-m-confl.) in non-f. firms is more costly than the conflict btw. family and non-family shareholders (as: f-and-non-f. s-hlds.) in fndr-CEO firms. However, the conflict btw. f-and-non-f. s-hlds. in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the o-m-confl. in non-f. firms. |
SCIMA