search query: @indexterm Shares / total: 249
reference: 69 / 249
Author: | Rustichini, A. Radner, R. |
Title: | The design and performance of sharing rules for a partnership in continuous time |
Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : FEB, VOL. 12:2, p. 245-265 |
Index terms: | DESIGN MANAGEMENT SHARES GAMES |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The authors study repeated partnership with imperfect monitoring and risk neutrality. The interval between the partners' decisions, the delay, is given but can be arbitrarily small. Each stage-game's output is Gaussian, with mean and variance depending on the partners' actions, making the sequence of outcomes a discretization of a diffusion. A sharing rule is efficient if there is an equilibrium of the corresponding game whose outcomes are Pareto efficient; it is stable if these equilibria approach a limit as the delay approaches zero. |
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