search query: @author Acemoglu, D. / total: 25
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Author: | Acemoglu, D. Shimer, R. |
Title: | Efficient unemployment insurance |
Journal: | Journal of Political Economy
1999 : OCT, VOL. 107:5, p. 893-928 |
Index terms: | POLITICAL ECONOMY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EFFICIENCY |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion. An increase in risk aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance has the opposite effect: insured workers seek high-wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance, but an economy with risk-averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output. |
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