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| Author: | Serizawa, S. |
| Title: | Strategy-proof and symmetric social choice functions for public good economies |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1999 : JAN, VOL. 67:1, p. 121-145 |
| Index terms: | Public goods Economic theory Social change Econometrics Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, economies with one private good and one pure public good are studied, and many axioms of social choice functions are considered. Strategy-proofness says that no agent can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences, regardless of whether the other agents mis-represent or not, and whatever must be treated equally. Symmetry says that if two agents have the same preference, they must be treated equally. Anonymity says that when the preferences of two agents are switched, their consumption bundles are also switched. Individual rationality says that a social choice function never assigns an allocation which make some agent worse off than he would be by consuming no public good and paying nothing. |
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