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| Author: | Goldman, E. Slezak, S.L. |
| Title: | An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2006 : JUN, VOL. 80:3, p. 603-626 |
| Index terms: | agency theory compensation executives fraud |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article studies managerial incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation. The authors set up an agency model where managers exert productive effort but also divert valuable company resources to misrepresent performance. The authors study how the potential manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity. They also analyze the effect of recent regulatory changes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. |
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