search query: @indexterm FRAUD / total: 254
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| Author: | Johnson, S.A. Ryan, H.E. Tian, Y.S. |
| Title: | Managerial incentives and corporate fraud: the sources of incentives matter |
| Journal: | Review of finance
2009 : JAN, VOL 13:1 p. 115-145 |
| Index terms: | managers stock returns COMPANIES legislation fraud |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Operating performance and stock return results suggest that managers who commmit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause damage for managers' stockholdings than for options because of differences in convexity. Fraud firms have notably greater incentives from unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestricted stockholdings are their largest incentive source. The results of this research paper emphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status of incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraud firms also tend to have lower likelihood of fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud. |
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