search query: @journal_id 775 / total: 26
reference: 16 / 26
« previous | next »
Author:Sakuragawa, M.
Title:Overinvestment and overborrowing under the debt contract.
Journal:Economic Studies Quarterly
1993 : SEP, VOL. 44:3, p. 216-232
Index terms:INVESTMENT
BORROWING
CONTRACTS
Language:eng
Abstract:In the presence of asymmetric information between the lender and a borrower with costly monitoring, a contract form and an optimal loan size are investigated. The optimal contract has the features of a standard debt contract. However, the optimal loan size does not always take the form of maximum equity participation. If per unit of return from lending is a decreasing function of the loan size, the contract takes the form of maximum equity participation. Conversely, if per unit of return from lending is an increasing function of the loan size, overinvestment or overborrowing may arise.
SCIMA record nr: 109330
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA