search query: @author Cremer, H. / total: 26
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| Author: | Casamatta, G. Cremer, H. Pestieau, P. |
| Title: | The political economy of social security |
| Journal: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2000 : VOL. 102:3, p. 503-522 |
| Index terms: | SOCIAL SECURITY VOTING POLITICAL ECONOMY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees from a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. |
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