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| Author: | Immordino, G. Pagano, M. |
| Title: | Legal standards, enforcement and corruption |
| Journal: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2010 : SEP, VOL. 8:5, p. 1104-1132 |
| Index terms: | incomes corruption tax revenue law |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | More severe laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on tax revenue and the honesty of officers, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government increases with per capita income and decreases with corruption of officers. Contrary to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the self-interested government's chosen standard is a non-monotonic function of officers' corruption, which can be lower or higher than the one chosen by a benevolent regulator. International data on environmental regulation indicates that standards correlate positively with per-capita income and negatively with corruption, which is consistent with the model's predictions. |
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