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| Author: | Bjerk, D. |
| Title: | Glass ceilings or sticky floors? Statistical discrimination in a dynamic model of hiring and promotion |
| Journal: | Economic Journal
2008 : JUL, VOL. 118:530, p. 961-982 |
| Index terms: | discrimination promotion recruitment |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It is shown here that when two groups differ in 1) their average skill set, 2) the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market and/or 3) the frequency with which have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even is companies become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs. |
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