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Author:Dijk, T. van
Title:Patent height and competition in product improvements
Journal:Journal of Industrial Economics
1996 : JUN, VOL. 44:2, p. 151-168
Index terms:INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
COMPETITION
PATENTS
Language:eng
Abstract:The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offers use in judging patentability defines the height of patent protection. The author studies patent height in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. A competitor who wants to invent around the other's patent is restricted by a minimum improvement level. The author shows that low patent protection does not affect market equilibrium without patent protection. A patent holder can lose with medium patent heights, but not if patents provide high protection.
SCIMA record nr: 152116
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