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Author:Fonseca, M. A.
Normann, H-T.
Title:Mergers, asymmetries and collusion: Experimental evidence
Journal:Economic Journal
2008 : MAR, VOL. 118:527, p. 387-400
Index terms:competition
duopoly
dynamic models
market structure
mergers
oligopoly
price level
Language:eng
Abstract:Using the amount of firms and the distribution of industry capacity as treatment variables, this paper examines the effect of mergers in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies. The results show that asymmetric markets produce lower prices than symmetric markets with same number of companies. These findings are compatible with a dynamic collusion model. Following the Nash prediction, duopolies have higher prices than triopolies when the (a)symmetry is controlled. The results indicate that merger's impact is anti-competitive. However, the price increase associated with mergers is small.
SCIMA record nr: 266885
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