search query: @indexterm SECRETARIES / total: 27
reference: 9 / 27
« previous | next »
Author:Bloch, F.
Markowitz, P.
Title:Optimal disclosure delay in multistage R&D competition
Journal:International Journal of Industrial Organization
1996 : VOL. 14:2, p. 159-202
Index terms:SECRETARIES
COMPETITION
INDUSTRIES
R&D
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper analyzes the effects of a policy of disclosure with delay on the speed of discovery and incentives to invest in a multi-stage patent race. Depending on the parameters, four equilibrium configurations are obtained. In the first, a single firm acts as a monopolist. In the second, a single firm invests at the initial stages, but the second firm joins the race after the disclosure of the intermediate product. In the third, both firms invest when they have equal knowledge, but only the leader invests before the disclosure of the intermediate product.
SCIMA record nr: 148643
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA