search query: @indexterm SECRETARIES / total: 27
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| Author: | Goswami, G. Noe, T. H. Rebello, M. J. |
| Title: | Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions. |
| Journal: | Review of Financial Studies
1996 : FALL VOL. 9:3, p. 757-785 |
| Index terms: | AUCTIONS TREASURY BILLS VALUATION PRICES SECRETARIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-price auctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in discriminatory auctions. When communication between bidders is introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-price auctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions. This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure. |
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