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| Author: | Zhu, T. |
| Title: | Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : AUG, VOL. 42:4, p. 549-560 |
| Index terms: | Contracts Investments Mathematical models |
| Freeterms: | Information seeking |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In a typical procurement setup, several recent papers have shown that when complete contracting is not possible, noncontingent contracts may suffice to solve the under-investment problem. A noncontingent contract offer such as fixed-price contract may induce the seller to acquire information on the future course of costs and only to accept the offer if the cost is low. |
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