search query: @journal_id 1389 / total: 274
reference: 14 / 274
| Author: | Potters, J. Winden, F. |
| Title: | Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment. Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2000 : DEC, VOL. 43:4, p. 499-522 |
| Index terms: | GAME THEORY STUDENTS PROFESSIONALIZATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies comparing students and professionals, the authors find significant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional subjects appear to behave more in line with the game-theoretical predictions, display a higher degree of separation, and earn more money. |
SCIMA