search query: @freeterm ownership structure / total: 28
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| Author: | Harford, J. Mansi, S.A. Maxwell, W.F. |
| Title: | Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2008 : MAR, VOL. 87:3, p. 535-555 |
| Index terms: | finance corporate governance companies USA |
| Freeterms: | acquisitions ownership structure cash holdings takeover provisions |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Based on anti-takeover provisions and inside ownership and governance (henceforth as: gov.) metrics, firms with weaker corporate gov. structures are found to actually have smaller cash reserves and choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash (here as: ex-cash) and weak shareholder rights (as: shr-rights) leads to increases in acquisitions (as: acqs.) and capital expenditures (as: cap-expts). Companies with low shr-rights and ex-cash have lower profitability (as: prf-ty.) and valuations. Yet, there is only limited evidence of the presence of ex-cash changing the overall relation btw. prf-ty. and gov. In the U.S, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acqs. and cap-expts., rather than to keep it. |
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