search query: @indexterm MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS / total: 283
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| Author: | Aggarwal, R. K. Samwick, A. A. |
| Title: | Performance incentives within firms: the effect of managerial responsibility |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
2003 : AUG, VOL. 58:4, p. 1613-1649 |
| Index terms: | Incentives Performance appraisal Managerial effectiveness Responsibility |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay-performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $ 32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay-divisional performance sensitivity and the pay-firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the percision of divisional performance. The results support principal-agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort. |
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