search query: @indexterm TARIFFS / total: 286
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| Author: | Levy, P. |
| Title: | Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting |
| Journal: | Journal of International Economics
1999 : APR, VOL. 47:2, p. 345-370 |
| Index terms: | INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION TARIFFS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a theory of tariff protection that incorporates cooperative behavior and lobbying. Governments use import tariffs or subsidies to maximize a weighted sum of lobbying contributions and general welfare. Governments do not use export taxes or subsidies and thus balance the interests of export and import-competing lobbies in setting tariff levels. In a symmetric model, cooperation between governments is sustained by threats of punishment in future periods. |
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