search query: @indexterm Agency theory / total: 286
reference: 62 / 286
« previous | next »
Author:Kang, E.
Title:Investors's perceptions of managerial opportunism in corporate acquisitions: the moderating role of environmental conditions
Journal:Corporate governance
2006 : SEP, VOL. 14:5, p. 377-387
Index terms:agency theory
corporate governance
Language:eng
Abstract:In this article it was found that the effectiveness of a firm's monitoring mechanisms to prevent managerial opportunism in acquisitions becomes more important under high environmental complexity and/or dynamism due to the increased information asymmetry between investors and top executives under these conditions. Furthermore, increased monitoring under non-complex and/or stable environments may be viewed negatively by investors, and that symbolic information about governance arrangements affects investorÂ’s evaluations of managerial opportunism in acquisitions. The findings stress the need for further research on factors that influence the explanatory power of agency theory.
SCIMA record nr: 262599
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA