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| Author: | Wowak, A.J. Hambrick, D.C. |
| Title: | A model of person-pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements |
| Journal: | Strategic Management Journal
2010 : AUG, VOL. 31:8, p. 803-821 |
| Index terms: | chief executive officers executive remuneration compensation management pay stock options agency theory models |
| Freeterms: | upper echelons |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It is indicated by research that organizational outcomes are influenced by executive (CEO) characteristics (herein as: exct-chars.) and incentive (as: inct/s.) compensation. Yet, the literatures within these two domains follow distinct, separate paths. This paper offers a framework for integrating these two perspectives. A new model is presented specifying how exct-chars. and inct/s. operate to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. Focusing on three individual-level attributes, that is, i. executive drives and motives, ii. cognitive frame, and iii. self-confidence, there are developed propositions detailing how executives will differ in their risk-taking behaviours in response to stock options. Furthermore, it is argued that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability etc. |
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