search query: @indexterm agency theory / total: 286
reference: 7 / 286
| Author: | Deutsch, Y. Keil, T. Laamanen, T. |
| Title: | A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk |
| Journal: | Strategic Management Journal
2011 : VOL. 32:2, p. 212-227 |
| Index terms: | agency theory risk risk behaviour management executives executive remuneration directors compensation stock options |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article analyses the effects of compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO on firm-level risk taking. Data from S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2006 suggests that providing the CEO or outside directors with stock options increases risk taking, especially in the case of outside directors. Surprisingly, however, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, the effect of outside directors reduces CEO's tendency to take risks. |
SCIMA