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| Author: | Ehrman, C. Peters, M. |
| Title: | Sequential selling mechanisms |
| Journal: | Economic Theory
1994 : VOL. 4:2, p. 237-253 |
| Index terms: | SELLING COMMUNICATION BUYING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper the authors attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this the authors consider the well-known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group of N buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. The arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. |
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