search query: @author Rosenzweig, M. / total: 3
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| Author: | Foster, A. Rosenzweig, M. |
| Title: | A test for moral hazard in the labor market: contractual arrangements, effort, and health |
| Journal: | Review of Economics and Statistics
1994 : MAY, VOL. 76:2, p. 213-227 |
| Index terms: | LABOUR MARKETS MORAL HAZARD TEST STATISTICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Moral hazard plays a central role in many models depicting contractual relationships involving worker effort. The authors show how time-series information on worker health, consumption and work time can be used to measure the effort effects of payment schemes. Estimates from longitudinal data describing farming rural households indicate that time-wage payment schemes and share-tenancy contracts reduce effort compared to piece-rate payment schemes and on-farm employment. |
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