search query: @author Phelan, C. / total: 3
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| Author: | Phelan, C. |
| Title: | Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1995 : AUG, VOL. 66:2, p. 488-506 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMICS MORAL HAZARD THEORIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique, market-determined insurance contract with the property that agents never want to walk away from it. The paper shows that trade (or insurance) still occurs and that a non-degenerate long-run distribution of consumption exists. |
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