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Author:Neeman, Z.
Title:Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : SEP, VOL. 16:1, p. 77-96
Index terms:SPECULATION
TRADE
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's notion of common p-belief and show that when traders entertain doubts about the rationality of other traders, arbitrarily large volumes of trade as well as rationality may be common p-belief for a large p. Furthermore, rationality and trade may simultaneously be known to arbitrary large (but finite) degree.
SCIMA record nr: 152521
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