search query: @author Damme, E. van / total: 3
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| Author: | Damme, E. van Hurkens, S. |
| Title: | Commitment robust equilibria endogenous timing |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : AUG, VOL. 15:2, p. 290-311 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates which equilibria of a game are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves. To that end the authors study a model of endogenous timing in which players face the trade-off between committing early and moving late. It is shown that mixed equilibria of the original game are subgame perfect in the timing game only when no player has an incentive to move first. Consequently, mixed equilibria are viable only if no player has an incentive to move first. |
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