search query: @author Corchon, L. C. / total: 3
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| Author: | Baliga, S. Corchon, L. C. Sjöström, T. |
| Title: | The theory of implementation when the planner is a player. |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1997 : NOV, VOL. 77, p. 15-33 |
| Index terms: | CHOICE THEORY SOCIAL CHOICE AGENCIES PLANNING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. They assume that agents have complete information and play simultaneously and given the message announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. The authors compare their results to standard results on Nash implementation. |
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