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| Author: | Gu, W. Kuhn, P. |
| Title: | A theory of holdouts in wage bargaining |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1998 : JUN, VOL. 88:3, p. 428-449 |
| Index terms: | THEORIES PAY BARGAINING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Holdouts ( the continuation of negotiations beyond the contract expiry date) are the most common form of disputes in labour contract negotiations. The authors model holdouts as a delaying tactic employed by unions to obtain information about other bargaining outcomes in their industry. Novel implications of the model include a positive association between holdout duration and the number of bargaining pairs negotiating contracts simultaneously; bunching of holdout duration within these "negotiating groups"; and fewer strikes among holdouts which end later in groups. |
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