search query: @author Myerson, R. / total: 3
reference: 2 / 3
« previous | next »
Author:Myerson, R.
Title:Extended poisson games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
1998 : OCT, VOL. 25:1, p. 111-131
Index terms:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
MANAGEMENT
Language:eng
Abstract:The Poisson model of games with population uncertainty is extended, by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility functions may depend on an unknown state of the world. Such extended Poisson games are applied to prove a generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem. Most applications of game theory begin the construction of a game model by specifying a given number of players. This assumption might seem to be innocuous, because any real game situation must involve some finite number of players.
SCIMA record nr: 186496
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA