search query: @author Cadsby, C. B. / total: 3
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| Author: | Cadsby, C. B. Maynes, E. |
| Title: | Corporate takeovers in the laboratory when shareholders own more than one share |
| Journal: | Journal of Business
1998 : OCT, VOL. 71:4, p. 537-572 |
| Index terms: | Mergers Companies Stock markets Shareholders Game theory Models |
| Freeterms: | Corporate takeovers |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares are studied in the laboratory to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process. Tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level. Contrary to predictions (of game theories), bid type and bid level affect the number of shares tendered and the bid success rate. |
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