search query: @author Stole, L. / total: 3
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| Author: | Prendergast, C. Stole, L. |
| Title: | Restricting the means of exchange within organizations |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
1999 : APR, VOL. 43:4-6, p. 1007-1019 |
| Index terms: | MONETARY ECONOMICS RENT-SEEKING EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATIONS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper considers why firms often ban monetary exchange btw. their employees, while encouraging these trades through other means, such as through the reciprocation of of favours or barter. Despite classical inefficiencies associated with non-monetary exchange, there are llustrated two themes as to why non-monetary trade may preferred to allowing money. First, the use of non-monetary trade may affect the allocation of rents in surplus-enhancing ways, as as agents respond strategically to the existence of these rents. Second, non-monetary trade improves the ability of agents to impose sanctions on those who act dishonestly. |
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