search query: @author Bennedsen, M. / total: 3
reference: 2 / 3
Author: | Bennedsen, M. Wolfenzon, D. |
Title: | The balance of power in closely held corporations. |
Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2000 : OCT-NOV, VOL. 58:1-2, p. 113-139 |
Index terms: | Company ownership Share ownership Shareholders Control theory |
Freeterms: | Control dilution Controlling coalition One-share-one vote |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The authors analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its share. They show that the founder of the firm can optimally chose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. By grouping member cash flows, a coalition internalizes to a larger extent the consequences of its actions and hence takes more efficient actions than would any of its individual members. |
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