search query: @author Lagunoff, R. / total: 3
reference: 2 / 3
| Author: | Haller, H. Lagunoff, R. |
| Title: | Genericity and Markovian behavior in stochastic games |
| Journal: | Econometrica
2000 : SEP, VOL. 68:5, p. 1231-1248 |
| Index terms: | STOCHASTIC GAMES ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines Markov perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. The authors' main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. The authors further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game. The paper starts with the explanation that if a finite action game is infinitely repeated, then the standard theory of repeated games has little to say about what will happen. |
SCIMA