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Author:Anand, B.
Galetovic, A.
Title:Information, nonexcludability, and financial market structure
Journal:Journal of Business
2000 : JUL, VOL. 73:3, p. 357-402
Index terms:INFORMATION
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors study the determinants of market structure in financial intermediation markets when property rights over information are weak. The authors show that incentives to gather information to screen firms can be preserved in decentralized markets with more than one intermediary. Local monopoly power is sustained by an aggregate oligopolistic market structure, where intermediaries voluntarily refrain from free riding.
SCIMA record nr: 222991
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