search query: @author Schuhmacher, F. / total: 3
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| Author: | Schuhmacher, F. |
| Title: | Verhandlungssichere Finanzierungsvertraege im Dyopol |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
2001 : MAR, VOL. 53:2, p. 127-154 |
| Index terms: | PRODUCT MARKETING MARKET SHARE PROFIT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In a Cournot duopoly with perfect information, the choice of a bank loan commitment with observable terms allows an entrepreneur to adopt an aggressive stance on the product market and to increase his market share and profit. Such an approach, however, becomes problematic exactly then when entrepreneur and bank are able to enter into new loan commitments by way of secret renegotiations. The reason for this is that if the entrepreneur anticipates that it is optimal to cancel secretely earlier bank loan commitments, he will ex ante not be motivated to finalise a loan commitment with observable terms. |
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