search query: @author Rao, R. C. / total: 3
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| Author: | Rao, R. C. Syam, N. |
| Title: | Equilibrium Price Communication and Unadvertised Specials by Competing Supermarkets |
| Journal: | Marketing Science
2001 : VOL. 20:1, p. 61-81 |
| Index terms: | PRICES COMPETITION SUPERMARKETS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper is concerned with how retailers, supermarkets in particular, communicate price discounts and use unadvertised specials. The authors formulate a game- theoretic model of retail competition by first extending the work of Lal and Matutes (1994) and then developing an alternative framework to answer these questions. The authors' model has two retailers, each of whom carries two goods. To simplify exposition, the authors assume that the stores are symmetric, the two goods are symmetric in their reservation prices, and are neither substitutes nor complements. Consumers are identical in their preferences and consumer heterogeneity is in the convenience that each store presents to a representative consumer. |
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