search query: @author Nyborg, K. G. / total: 3
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| Author: | Nyborg, K. G. Strebulaev, I. A. |
| Title: | Collateral and short squeezing of liquidity in fixed rate tenders |
| Journal: | Journal of International Money and Finance
2001 : NOV, VOL. 20:6, p. 769-792 |
| Index terms: | BIDDING CENTRAL BANKS LIQUIDITY |
| Freeterms: | FIXED RATES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper models fixed rate tenders, where a central bank offers to lend central bank funds to financial institutions. Bidders are constrained by the amount of collateral they have. The authors focus on the strategic interaction between bidding in the tender and trading in the interbank market after the tender, where short squeezes could occur. They study how the design of the tender affects equilibrium bidding behavior and the incidence of short squeezes. |
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