search query: @author Pichler, P. / total: 3
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| Author: | Pichler, P. Wilhelm, W. |
| Title: | A theory of the syndicate: form follows function |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
2001 : DEC, VOL. 56:6, p. 2237-2264 |
| Index terms: | INVESTMENT BANKS MORAL HAZARD |
| Freeterms: | SYNDICATES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represent a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for individual bankers to cultivate investor relationships that translate into greater expected proceeds. Reputational concerns of lead bankers amplify the effect. |
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