search query: @author Scharf, K. / total: 3
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| Author: | Raimondos-Moller, P. Scharf, K. |
| Title: | Transfer pricing rules and competing governments |
| Journal: | Oxford Economic Papers
2002 : APR, VOL. 54:2, p. 230-246 |
| Index terms: | Competition Transfer pricing Multinational companies Statistical methods Public sector |
| Freeterms: | Equilibrium |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. This paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above-optimal levels of effective taxation. Conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement are derived, and it is shown that harmonization according to the arm's length principle, the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD, may not be Pareto improving. |
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