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| Author: | Leone, A. J. |
| Title: | The Relation between Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements and Firm Characteristics: Evidence from the Managed Care Industry |
| Journal: | Journal of Management Accounting Research
2002 : VOL. 14:1, p. 99-118 |
| Index terms: | MORAL HAZARD AGENCY THEORY COSTS CONTRACTS HEALTH |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study examines contracts between HMDs and Primary Care Physicians. These contracts represent one important component of HMDs' management control systems. The author argues that HMDs design contracts to minimize agency costs that arise from the physician moral hazard problem. The agency costs and resulting HMO-physician-payment arrangements depend on an HMD's organizational form, customer mix, and environment. Physicians can work as HMD employees or as independent contractors operating individually or in group practice. These features, together with the HMD ownership structure, determine the HMD's organizational form. The level of Medicare enrollment characterizes the HMD's customer mix. |
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