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Author: | Stefanadis, C. |
Title: | Sunk Costs, Contestability, and the Latent Contract Market |
Journal: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
2003 : SPRING, VOL. 12:1, p. 119-138 |
Index terms: | COSTS CONTRACTS MARKETS ANALYTICAL REVIEW |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The idea that an industry with sunk costs may be contestable even in the absence of long-term contracts has received little attention informal economic theory yet is sometimes popular among practitioners. This paper formally illustrates the argument. In an infinitely repeated game, there exists a class of contestable outcomes in which the monopolist sells only on the spot market and charges low prices along the equilibrium path to prevent customers from resorting to long-term contracts. The crucial test for contestability is the level of transaction costs in the latent contract market. The paper provides a substantial list of references on this subject. |
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