search query: @author Anton, J. J. / total: 3
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| Author: | Anton, J. J. Yao, D. A. |
| Title: | Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information |
| Journal: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
2003 : VOL. 12:2, p. 151-178 |
| Index terms: | PATENTS STRATEGY INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. The authors model a product-innovation setting in which a valid patent gives market exclusivity and find a unique signaling equilibrium. One might expect that as the probability that a patent will be invalid becomes low, greater disclosure will be induced. The authors do not find this expectation to be generally supported. Further, even where full disclosure arises in equilibrium, it is only the less capable who make full disclosures. The equilibrium analysis also highlights many of the novel and appealing features of enabling knowledge disclosure signals. |
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