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| Author: | Gagnepain, P. Ivaldi, M. |
| Title: | Incentive regulatory policies: the case of public transit systems in France |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
2002 : WINTER, VOL. 33:4, p. 605-629 |
| Index terms: | Urban transport Passenger transport Vehicle scheduling France |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors assess the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation, using a principal-agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transport industry. Fixed-price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second-best schemes. Cost-plus contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contract. From these results, the authors may conjecture that fixed-price contracts call for better-informed regulators. |
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