search query: @author Spagnolo, G. / total: 3
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Author: | Spagnolo, G. |
Title: | Managerial incentives and collusive behavior |
Journal: | European Economic Review
2005 : AUG, VOL. 49:6, p. 1501-1523 |
Index terms: | corporate governance control executives compensation earnings cartels oligopoly models |
Freeterms: | collusion |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | In this paper, the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives are characterized on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits, manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts' duration. |
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