search query: @author Bebchuk, L.A. / total: 3
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| Author: | Bebchuk, L.A. Cohen, A. |
| Title: | The costs of entrenched boards |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2005 : NOV, VOL. 78:2, p. 409-433 |
| Index terms: | board of directors corporate governance public companies |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded companies companies is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. It is found that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in company value (as measured by Tobin's Q). Also, suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, a reduced company value is provided. |
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