search query: @author Polasky, S. / total: 3
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| Author: | Tarui, N. Polasky, S. |
| Title: | Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behaviour |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2005 : NOV, VOL.. 50:3, p. 447-467 |
| Index terms: | environmental protection regulations technology |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated upon learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty, neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an efficient solution except in special cases. When there is little uncertainty, rules are superior to discretion because discreationary policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future regulation. However, when uncertainty is large, discretion is superior to rules because it allows regulation to incorporate new information. According to the authors, taxes are superior to standards under discretion regardless of the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal damages for the case of quadratic abatement costs and damages. |
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