search query: @author Guay, W.R. / total: 3
reference: 3 / 3
« previous | next »
| Author: | Core, J.E. Guay, W.R. Verdi, R.S. |
| Title: | Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting & Economics
2006 : SEP, VOL. 41:3, p. 307-333 |
| Index terms: | corporate governance non-profit organizations companies |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines three alternative explanations for excess endowments (hereafter as: ex-ends.) in not-for-profit firms: 1. growth opportunities, 2. monitoring, or 3. agency problems. It is found that most ex-ends. are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent ex-ends. do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with ex-ends., and CEO, director and total officer pay are greater for firms with ex-ends. Overall, it is found that ex-ends. are associated with greater agency problems. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA